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DESCRIPTION:Quan Le presenting\, "Network Competition and Exclusive Contrac
 ts: Evidence from News Agencies".\n\nAbstract: This paper studies exclusive
  vertical contracts in network industries and asks whether exclusive arrang
 ements intended to be anti-competitive in one market segment can be pro-com
 petitive in another. The setting is news agencies in the early 20th-century
  United States\, which historically operated with exclusive territory contr
 acts intended to create local newspaper monopolies. I examine whether these
  contracts between the Associated Press (AP) and member newspapers inadvert
 ently created demand for and facilitated the growth of the AP’s primary riv
 al\, United Press (UP).  I introduce a model that captures the demand for n
 ews agencies\, newspaper entry\, and news agency network formation. I estim
 ate the model using a unique dataset that includes news agencies’ subscript
 ions\, costs\, and physical maps of their networks over time. I find that e
 conomies of scale and network effects form considerable natural barriers to
  entry for news agencies. Counterfactual simulations show that UP likely wo
 uld have exited if AP exclusive territory contracts were illegal. In contra
 st\, contracts that require AP newspapers to subscribe exclusively to the A
 P would have weakened UP as well as incumbent AP newspapers that can no lon
 ger bundle content from both news agencies.
DTEND:20240116T173000Z
DTSTAMP:20260317T150842Z
DTSTART:20240116T160000Z
GEO:41.878469;-87.627323
LOCATION:\, 407
SEQUENCE:0
SUMMARY:Economics Job Market Paper Presentation
UID:tag:localist.com\,2008:EventInstance_45342693432051
URL:https://events.depaul.edu/event/economics_job_market_paper_presentation
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